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asian military trends and their 
implications for australia
The countries of Asia have been in a state of 
rapid economic growth for several decades, 
with one dramatic (but brief) setback during 
the 1997 financial crisis. Growth rates have 
averaged almost 7%, well above the world 
average, meaning that economies doubled 
in size in just a decade.1
One consequence of that growth has been a 
widely reported military build up around the 
Indian and Pacific Ocean basins. This ASPI 
Strategic Insights looks at the trends in Asian 
military spending, the capabilities being 
acquired and the implications for Australia’s 
future force structure and strategic posture.
Australia, Japan and South Korea are all building air warfare destroyers fitted with the Aegis radar and fire control system. The Standard-Missile-3 
(here being launched from Japan’s JDS Kongo) can be used in the ballistic missile defence role. Photo: US Navy
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Introduction
It is easy to interpret expansions in military 
power in terms of an ‘arms race’—a self-
sustaining dynamic that leads to spiralling 
levels of procurement and spending in excess 
of the ‘steady-state’ levels typical of the 
countries involved. But that is a simplistic 
analysis. Instead, what we are seeing in many 
countries within Asia is reminiscent of the 
military programs that Western nations have 
been investing in for decades. Acquisitions 
of high-performance aircraft, warships and 
submarines by Western European countries 
do not generate concerns of rising militarism. 
So it is not necessarily the case that such 
purchases in Asia should be a cause for worry.
However, Asia has not had the half a century 
of focus provided by the Cold War threat of 
the Soviet Union that united Western Europe. 
There are unresolved historical enmities and 
disputes over territories and resources that 
have the potential to cause friction in the 
future and the dynamics of increasing military 
power are harder to predict. In many ways 
Asia is entering a regime of which we have 
no experience, in which all of the historical 
powers of this region are simultaneously 
wealthy, stable and militarily strong. As well, 
US primacy in the region, itself a legacy of 
World War II, is now coming into question for 
the first time.
In a region that is largely free of 
active conflict, arms acquisition 
and modernisation programs are 
motivated by a number of factors.
To understand the trends in Asian militaries, 
it is necessary to look at a number of 
indicators, beginning with spending patterns 
and moving on through acquisition programs 
and military restructuring to declaratory 
policy—though the latter is not always 
helpful. Not surprisingly, there is no single 
narrative that accurately describes the entire 
region from Pakistan and India in the west 
around to the Koreas, Japan and Russia in 
the east. Many different motivations exist 
concurrently, and the resources that various 
countries can bring to bear vary markedly, 
resulting in a many-faceted picture.
In a region that is largely free of active 
conflict, arms acquisition and modernisation 
programs are motivated by a number of 
factors. These include:
• a perceived external threat
• hedging against nascent external threats
• hedging against future uncertainties 
in the absence of readily identified 
threats, often achieved by balancing or 
overmatching the capabilities of other 
regional countries
• strategic aspiration, manifested as the 
development of power projection and/or 
protection and denial capabilities
• continuing requirements for 
counter-insurgency and internal security 
forces in some countries 
• the ongoing reorientation of national 
forces away from land-based post-colonial 
or counter-insurgency light infantry 
and paramilitary forces towards force 
structures that are based around high-end 
platforms, as is typical of prosperous and 
stable countries elsewhere
• the symbolism of modern military 
equipment for status and prestige
• combinations of any of the above.
Existential threats exist for a number of 
Asian countries. India and Pakistan are very 
watchful of one another, and have structured 
their nuclear and conventional forces with 
each other in mind. But that does not mean 
that they do not have other considerations. 
Both also have internal security issues to 
manage, and India is also an aspiring major 
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the acquisition of advanced capabilities 
elsewhere. The lack of specific and immediate 
threats has the tendency to result in force 
structures that do not emphasise any 
specific capabilities—what is sometimes 
(erroneously) called in Australia the ‘balanced 
force’ approach.
While there is little evidence of an Asia-wide 
arms race, there are certainly instances 
where developments by one country have 
resulted in similar developments among 
their neighbours. Following Singapore’s force 
modernisation efforts, Malaysia has also 
acquired modern combat aircraft, and is in the 
process of acquiring conventional submarines.
Some acquisition programs are driven 
by national industry considerations. The 
in-country construction of military hardware 
is seen—rightly or wrongly—as a way to 
bootstrap high-tech industries and a way 
in which to achieve a degree of defence 
self-reliance. Finally, the lure of modern 
military platforms as a status symbol of 
national achievement should not be ignored.
The lure of modern military platforms 
as a status symbol of national 
achievement should not be ignored.
From an Australian viewpoint, there are two 
main trends that bear watching. First, the 
military acquisition programs of the nearby 
countries of Southeast Asia have the potential 
to erode Australia’s qualitative technological 
edge—which was the explicit underpinning 
of the 2000 Defence White Paper.
Second, the rise of major powers further afield 
with strategic power projection and/or broad 
area denial capabilities has the potential to 
change the power balance of the wider region. 
Given that Australia is quite comfortable with 
the status quo, in which its ally the United 
States has been by far the strongest player 
power. The Republic of Korea has an ongoing 
threat from the large conventional forces and 
(uncertain) nuclear capability of North Korea, 
but is also developing the air and naval forces 
that are typical of middle powers elsewhere. 
Similarly, North Korea’s missile capability has 
been a strong driver of Japanese efforts to 
develop missile defence systems.
Perceived nascent threats drive many regional 
players. In particular, the uncertainty of the 
future trajectory of China has played a role 
in the development of many forces and 
strategies, including those of the United 
States. It has also been a factor in the 
development and strengthening of security 
relationships around the region. However, 
the defence spending data does not support 
claims that these hedging strategies have 
developed into an arms race between Asian 
countries. (The situation between the United 
States and China is more contestable, as will 
be described later.)
China and India are aspiring major powers; 
both have stated ambitions for blue water 
navies (including nuclear submarines and 
aircraft carriers) and long-range strike 
capabilities that will allow force projection far 
from home. China, however, also has what 
it sees as a threat in the form of a potential 
Taiwanese ‘break away’. Consequently, it 
has devoted a lot of resources to develop 
denial capabilities around Taiwan so that the 
United States cannot easily intervene and in 
capabilities that blunt US advantages, such as 
space and command and control systems.
Some countries do not have readily identified 
threats, and realistically have no ambitions to 
develop military capabilities with unilateral 
global reach.
In such countries—epitomised by 
Australia—force structures are developed 
and maintained as a generalised hedge 
against future deterioration of strategic 
circumstances and/or as an insurance against 
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Figure 1(a) shows that the United States is, 
by far, a bigger spender on defence than any 
country in the region (as well as illustrating 
the dramatic increase in US spending since 
2001). That is hardly a surprise, and it should 
be noted that US spending supports global 
forces. But it does tell us that the United 
States can be a significant player in our region 
for some time to come, should it choose to 
be. The most interesting question becomes 
whether there are areas in which the US can 
be seriously militarily challenged.
Figure 1(b) shows the spending patterns for 
the major players in North Asia. The rapid 
increase in Chinese spending is obvious, but 
it is interesting to see the response (or lack 
thereof) from Japan. As well as increasing 
markedly in absolute terms, Chinese spending 
has increased from a modest 0.9% of GDP to 
more than 1.5% over the last decade, although 
that is based on official Chinese figures and 
is likely to be an underestimate. Studies by 
the US-based RAND Corporation, the Council 
on Foreign Relations and the US Defense 
Department variously estimate China’s actual 
military spending to be between 2.44% and 
5.45% of GDP.3
for decades, any potential change requires 
serious thought.
Defence spending
There are two measures of defence spending 
that provide useful inputs to a discussion of 
regional trends. The percentage of a state’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) spent on 
defence is a good measure of the importance 
placed upon military matters—it allows us to 
infer what countries think about their military 
circumstance. But a more important measure 
is the absolute amount spent on defence, 
which is a useful (if blunt) measure of what a 
country can do. To give an extreme example, 
if the Solomon Islands began to devote 
50% of its GDP to defence, it would certainly 
tell us that something had galvanised their 
attention, but we still wouldn’t expect them 
to become a major power.
What then do spending patterns show us? 
Figures 1(a) to 1(d) show the spending over the 
last decade (in constant year 2000 dollars) 
for various combinations of regional states.2 
These graphs suggest a number of broad 
conclusions, which will be discussed and 
tested in later sections.
Figure 1(a) US and Asian defence spending 1997–2007
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)
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There is little evidence in this data for 
an arms race in North Asia, despite 
much speculation and frequent claims 
to the contrary.
Figure 1(c) shows the spending patterns of 
China and India. As discussed later, there are 
some strong similarities in the approaches 
to military spending by these two countries. 
Over the last decade, Chinese spending has 
increased by a factor of four, while Indian 
spending has more than doubled (and has 
accelerated in recent years). The spending 
data is consistent with a major strategic 
competition between the two countries. 
However, Indian spending is flat in GDP terms 
(at just over 2%) and the overall increase has 
been due to a rapid general economic growth. 
We should be cautious in interpreting this as 
anything other than a proportional expansion 
of the military along with general economic 
development.5 It is more the nature of some 
Indian programs that sheds light on their 
ambitions as a rising power.
Japanese spending trends show no evidence 
for an arms race. Military outlays have been 
nearly flat in real terms over the last decade 
and have actually declined slightly, from 1% to 
0.9% of GDP. There is no sign that Japan has 
responded aggressively to increased Chinese 
spending, but there are two pertinent points 
to keep in mind. Firstly, Japanese military 
developments are constrained by the 
constitution and, while there are no formal 
spending limits, the 1% of GDP figure has 
come to be accepted as appropriate. Secondly, 
Japan currently spends more than China in 
absolute terms and has done so for decades, 
which has resulted in Japan currently fielding 
much stronger conventional military forces 
(with some niche exceptions). Similarly, 
South Korean spending has been flat in 
GDP terms while increasing modestly in real 
terms. Currently, there is little evidence in this 
data for an arms race in North Asia, despite 
much speculation and frequent claims to the 
contrary.4 But the potential for an arms race 
to develop cannot be discounted, and it will 
be interesting to watch spending patterns 
as China’s total expenditure matches or 
exceeds Japan’s.
Figure 1(b) North Asian defence spending 1997–2007
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)
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of percentage of GDP, and real spending 
increases seem to be driven by economic 
growth rather than by changed strategic 
assessments. Bucking the trend, Australia has 
increased spending from 1.8% of GDP to 2.0% 
in the last few years, although the growth has 
been more to do with the cost of operations 
than investment in new equipment, which 
has seen only modest increases.
Figure 1(d) shows the patterns of defence 
spending in Southeast Asia (including 
Australia). The data shows that Australia is, 
by a large margin, the biggest spender on 
defence in the region and consistently spends 
two thirds of the total amount of all other 
countries combined. Singapore is a clear 
second. The spending of other Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states 
remains modest. There is no growth in terms 
Figure 1(d): Southeast Asian defence spending 1997–2007
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)
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Figure 1(c) Indian and Chinese defence spending 1997–2007
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)
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parts, fuel, ammunition and provisions and 
the salaries of personnel. (Table 1 shows 
the current military strengths of regional 
states.) Acquisition budgets and research and 
development programs constitute a relatively 
small proportion of total spending.
Acquiring capability
The governments of Asia are spending 
hundreds of billions of dollars per year on 
their militaries. Most of the money (around 
75–80%) goes into maintaining and training 
the existing forces, providing for spare 
Table 1: Conventional military strength in Asia, 2008
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Australia 54,747 19,915 59 1,304+ 
(in delivery)
138 135 12 14 6 3
Northeast Asia
China 2,105,000 800,000 7,660+ 5,350+ 2,554 533 75 233 62 74
Japan 240,000 41,800 900 960 340 641 53 9 16 5
North Korea7 1,106,000 4,700,000 3,500+ 3,060+ 590 306 8 335 63 10
South Korea 687,700 4,500,000 2,390 4,622 563 481 44 75 12 10
Taiwan 290,000 1,657,000 926+ 2,230 510 275 26 70 4 19
Southeast Asia
Indonesia 302,000 400,000 0 1,069 94 132 29 41 2 27
Malaysia 109,000 51,600 6 1,575 68 80 11 14 0 1
Myanmar 406,000 no data 150 545 125 66 3 67 0 0
Philippines 106,000 131,000 0 629 30 113 1 62 0 7
Singapore 72,500 312,500 196 1,924+ 102 92+ 9 29 4 4
Thailand 306,000 200,000 333 1,554 182 292 20 87 0 9
Vietnam 455,000 5,000,000 1,315 2,400 219 91 11 38 2 6
South Asia
India 1,288,000 1,155,000 4,509 2,983 599 531+ 48 18 16 17
Pakistan 619,000 no data 2,461+ 1,266 376 220 6 8 8 0
Extra-regional states
Russia 1,027,000 20,000,000 23,000+ 27,190+ 2,080 1,589+ 62 74 67 45+
United States 1,498,157 1,082,718 8,023+ 28.454 4,269 5,289 106 16 71 32
Notes: All figures are estimates and include some equipment held in store. Figures are not shown for coast guard and 
paramilitary forces.
1. Main battle tanks.
2. Includes light tanks, light armoured vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, infantry mobility vehicles and infantry 
fighting vehicles.
3. Includes fighters, bombers and armed maritime patrol aircraft.
4. Includes corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers.
5. Includes nuclear and conventional submarines.
6. Amphibious ship categories, including: tank landing ship, medium landing ship, heavy landing ship, amphibious 
landing platform, landing ship logistic and helicopter, landing ship dock, assault landing ship and landing ship 
helicopter and dock.
7. The majority of North Korean submarines are coastal and inshore vessels.
Source: The International Institute of Strategic Studies 2008, The Military Balance 2008, Routledge, Abingdon;  
Australian Defence Portfolio Budget Statements 2008–09.
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run complex development programs. It also 
allows countries to take advantage of the 
often vigorous competition for sales among 
arms suppliers.
But capability is not just equipment. In fact, 
obtaining the hardware is almost the easy 
part. Logistics and maintenance support 
is required to keep platforms operating, 
and the platforms must be integrated into 
command and control systems. Tactics have 
to be developed and crews trained and kept 
at a level of proficiency by regular training 
and exercising. Some Asian countries are 
beginning to appreciate the need for the 
command, control and support systems 
required to get the best from hardware they 
are acquiring, but many are not, and remain 
focused on the platforms almost as an end 
in themselves.7
Capability is not just equipment. In 
fact, obtaining the hardware is almost 
the easy part.
As is well known (through experience) in the 
West, the initial cost of a military platform 
is only a down payment on the through-life 
cost, which can often be three times the 
initial purchase cost. One of two things can 
happen with hardware purchases that are 
not thought through properly. The resources 
consumed by keeping ships at sea or aircraft 
flying will eat into future procurement 
budgets so that equipment is kept beyond 
its planned life—and never receives the 
upgrades required to keep it at the leading 
edge. Or, more likely, sailing days and flying 
hours will be curtailed, platform availability 
will be reduced and the proficiency of crews 
will fall, all of which will reduce capability. In 
the worst case, there will be little capability 
at all, and a few expensive platforms will 
become little more than photo-opportunities 
on national days.
The most visible part of acquisition programs 
are platforms—vehicles, aircraft, warships 
and submarines. And all of these are now 
being acquired in significant numbers. In 
many cases plans for these purchases date 
back well over a decade, and were put on 
hold during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
A decade of solid economic growth since then 
has allowed those plans to be realised.
The approach taken by a country to 
acquisition largely depends on the size 
of its economy, its sense of place in the 
international community and its level of 
access to advanced technology. The aspiring 
major powers China and India conduct 
experimental and development programs in 
addition to extensive construction activities 
and off-the-shelf purchases. Established 
powers such as Australia, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea tend to buy existing 
systems, but often build their own platforms. 
Construction programs can be the production 
of foreign designs under licence or based on 
indigenous designs, usually incorporating 
weapon or sensor technologies from 
elsewhere. For example, Australia’s air warfare 
destroyers will be of Spanish design, but will 
incorporate the US-designed Aegis combat 
system and US-sourced missiles. Smaller 
spenders tend to buy established designs as 
military off-the-shelf (MOTS) from established 
suppliers, with Western European countries 
and Russia often being the preferred vendors.
MOTS purchases allow significant leaps 
in capability without development risk. 
ASPI has written previously about regional 
submarine acquisition programs; MOTS 
purchases from Russia and other European 
suppliers have allowed regional nations to 
acquire credible capabilities in far shorter 
times than would be required to develop 
indigenous designs.6 Buying established 
designs avoids expense and minimises the 
requirement for the in-country industrial 
and technological capabilities required to 
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US-trained. The other front-line combat 
aircraft type in service is the F-16 Falcon. 
Singapore has been operating the F-16 since 
1988, and managed their fleet so that only 
the newest versions of the aircraft (Block 52 
and 52+) have been retained. That means that 
maintenance and support requirements are 
spread over only two main combat types and 
that some weapons can be utilised by both 
aircraft types.
Malaysia, on the other hand, has taken a 
more piecemeal approach to the acquisition 
of its front-line combat aircraft. In the 
space of a decade, the Royal Malaysian Air 
Force acquired three different types, sourced 
from the US (eight F/A-18D Hornets in 1997) 
and from Russia (sixteen MiG-29N/NUBs in 
1995 and a 2003 contract for eighteen Sukhoi 
Su-30MKMs). Malaysia has expressed interest 
in AEW&C aircraft, but it does not operate 
any and it also lacks air-to-air refuelling 
aircraft. Operating three different combat 
types in small numbers means that three 
fixed costs (for ground equipment, training 
Some Asian countries have recognised 
the principles of through-life capability 
management. China for example, appears to 
be making progress in developing the support 
structures and logistic chains required 
to capitalise on the investments made in 
hardware. And Singapore provides a model for 
efficient defence spending. The comparison 
of the combat aircraft acquisition programs 
of neighbours Singapore and Malaysia is 
illustrative of the issues that should be 
considered in defence purchasing.
After a long and rigorous period of evaluation 
of a number of aircraft from various sources, 
Singapore is in the process of acquiring a 
specially-developed variant of the Boeing F-15 
that will be fitted with an active electronically 
scanned array (AESA) radar. They are also 
acquiring an extensive package of support 
systems, spares and already-integrated 
weapons. Their F-15 aircraft will operate in 
conjunction with air-to-air refuelling and 
airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) 
aircraft and the crews will be proficient and 
The ability to buy capable platforms ‘off the shelf’ allows regional nations to leapfrog development generations. Here a Russian-built Kilo-class submarine 
is transported to China by the heavy lift cargo ship SS Sea Team. Photo: US Navy
10 Asian military trends and their implications for Australia
Some purchases seem to be made 
with little regard to the ‘critical mass’ 
or the support required to establish 
a viable capability, or even for the 
interoperability requirements with 
other elements of the same force.
That does not mean that all small acquisitions 
are of questionable value. Notwithstanding 
the lack of cost-effectiveness of some 
programs, it is still possible for countries 
to acquire capabilities in inefficiently small 
numbers but still have a significant impact on 
the calculus of other regional countries. For 
example, a single submarine known to be at 
sea but whose position is otherwise unknown 
can greatly complicate the planning of naval 
operations, especially in littoral environments. 
Indonesia has ordered four to six Russian 
submarines.8 Even if the management of 
these platforms leaves something to be 
desired, they will not be lightly dismissed. 
They will certainly be more competitive 
in a combat environment and have more 
strategic value than a handful of aircraft of 
dubious capability.
There are many lessons to be learned by 
Asian states as they embark on programs to 
acquire sophisticated military equipment. 
Money will, on occasion, be spent to very little 
effect. More often, procurement processes 
will be less efficient than they could be. 
But as experience is gained and the ‘traps 
for young players’ are identified, future 
acquisitions will be better thought out and 
through-life considerations and costs will play 
a greater part in decision making. That will 
still not guarantee success in every instance. 
As Australia’s Super Seasprite helicopter 
project will attest, decades of experience is 
sometimes not enough.
facilities, simulators etc) are incurred and 
each is amortised over a small number of 
airframes, reducing efficiency. The situation 
is exacerbated by having types from Russia 
and the US—meaning that there would be 
weapons only useable by specific aircraft or 
the costly and risky prospects of integrating 
Russian weapons onto US-aircraft or 
vice-versa (which Malaysia has tried and 
failed to do).
As we saw in Figure 1(d), Malaysia spends 
about half as much on defence as Singapore. 
To get the maximum value from its defence 
budget and keep the local military balance 
as level as possible, it would make sense to 
consolidate its spending on one or two types 
from the same supplier and use the savings to 
invest in the support elements and command 
and control systems that would multiply the 
combat effectiveness of the fleet. Singapore 
will get much more capability from each 
military investment dollar.
Even worse, some purchases seem to be 
made with little regard to the ‘critical mass’ 
or the support required to establish a viable 
capability, or even for the interoperability 
requirements with other elements of the 
same force. For example, since 2003 the 
Indonesian Air Force has operated just 
four Sukhoi Flanker aircraft (and even those 
comprised two different variants). The 
availability of this handful of aircraft has 
been limited and they have communication 
systems that are incompatible with 
Indonesian command and control systems. 
In 2006 Indonesia placed an order for 
six additional aircraft (adding two more 
variants to the mix). It is possible that these 
aircraft were acquired in order to familiarise 
the air force with modern combat aircraft, 
because the resultant fleet is too small to 
provide the training and numbers on the 
flight-line required to constitute a viable 
operational capability in anything but a short 
duration and very low-level air campaign.
Strategic Insights 11
seen to be as successful and powerful as 
neighbouring countries can drive ‘catch up’ 
purchases without setting in train a spiral 
of arms acquisitions. If the percentage 
of GDP spent on defence is a guide to 
thinking, ASEAN states are content with 
status quo relativities.
A desire to be seen to be as successful 
and powerful as neighbouring 
countries can drive ‘catch up’ 
purchases without setting in train a 
spiral of arms acquisitions.
The drivers of competition can also be 
external. The commercial marketing efforts 
of Israeli, Russian, US and Western European 
firms will also lead to new technologies being 
fielded. But increased wealth will allow a 
gradual increase in the sophistication of the 
armed forces of the region, and we can expect 
an increasing range of modern systems to 
be introduced.
A good case study of the proliferation into 
ASEAN of advanced weaponry via marketing 
is provided by air-to-air missiles. In the 1990s, 
the US refused to export the advanced 
medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) 
to Southeast Asia because there were no 
regional operators of beyond visual range 
(BVR) missiles and US policy was not to begin 
a competition. However, Russian suppliers 
showed no such reluctance and began 
offering BVR missiles to potential purchasers, 
including US ally Thailand. Eventually the US 
relented, and agreed to export AMRAAM 
to Thailand once other long-range air-to-air 
missiles entered the region.11 Today Australia, 
Malaysia12, Singapore and Thailand include 
AMRAAM in their inventory, and Russian 
AA-10 and AA-12 missiles are available for MiG 
and Sukhoi aircraft in service with Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam.
ASEAN
For some ASEAN countries, the last two 
decades has seen internal instability and 
insurgencies become much less problematic 
than in the past, allowing those states to 
direct their focus outwards to their maritime 
approaches and economic zones.9 As a result, 
there is a trend away from large but light land 
forces towards air and maritime platforms. 
And some land forces are receiving heavy 
equipment such as main battle tanks.
It is important to note that most ASEAN 
countries have started from a low 
technological baseline. In the mid 1970s, 
ASEAN states could be characterised as 
having large (as measured as a percentage 
of the population and compared to Western 
states) but lightly armed standing forces 
with few major weapon systems, some of 
which were inherited from former colonial 
powers. The focus was on land forces and 
many were operating with obsolete major 
platforms. Thailand was an exception, but 
that was because of strong US support due to 
the proximity of Thailand to the war zone in 
Vietnam. Today a range of ASEAN countries 
operate sophisticated armoured vehicles, 
artillery pieces, combat and support aircraft, 
warships and submarines.10
Local competition has played a part in some 
arms acquisition decisions. Advanced combat 
aircraft seem to be a case in point. Singapore’s 
purchase of F-16 aircraft in the 1980s was 
followed in rapid succession by acquisitions 
of modern aircraft by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam. And Malaysia’s 
pursuit of submarines may well owe much to 
Singapore’s own acquisition program.
However, while the element of competition 
is sometimes strong, the dynamic is not that 
of an arms race—as is shown by the flat 
spending profiles shown earlier. Competition 
can work in a number of ways, and strategic 
concern is only one driver. A desire to be 
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illustrate their respective priorities. Both have 
expressed a desire to build forces that would 
allow them to project power away from 
their shores and to be able to protect their 
broadly-defined interests in, respectively, the 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean. But China has 
a focus on Taiwan and an ability to contest the 
Taiwan Strait that has no Indian counterpart. 
As a result, the Chinese have put effort into 
goal-specific capabilities that are designed to 
blunt US advantages. India, on the other hand, 
has to manage the local conventional and 
nuclear competition with Pakistan (as well as 
being acutely conscious of Chinese military 
developments). Because of the perceived 
threat from Pakistan, India maintains very 
large land forces. For example, the Indian 
Army fields over 3,600 artillery pieces.
A significant development in the last decade 
has been the uptake of long-range supersonic 
cruise missiles. Based on Russian designs, 
China and India have further developed the 
technology to acquire systems that allow 
strike operations on land or maritime targets 
from long range and with potentially high 
lethality. Western states (like Australia) 
continue to rely on subsonic US and European 
sourced missiles.
China
China is modernising its forces and has 
ambitions for substantial power projection 
capabilities. Advances made with space 
systems and missiles shows that Chinese 
R&D and industry is capable of making rapid 
progress. However, some ambitions will take 
longer to realise. For example, the Chinese 
Navy (People’s Liberation Army (Navy), or 
PLA(N)) has ambitions to develop an aircraft 
carrier capability to project power far from 
shore. But, while an aircraft carrier capability 
would be consistent with a Chinese naval 
doctrine that includes dominance of the 
South China Sea, it seems to be a long-term 
goal. Little visible progress has been 
Barring a major economic downturn, the 
trajectory ASEAN states are currently on will 
continue into the future. Economic growth 
may level out because the impressive figures 
of recent years are harder to achieve from a 
higher baseline, but the funds available for 
military purchases will continue to increase.
Rising powers—China and India
China and India are aspiring major powers, 
and their military acquisition programs 
reflect their ambitions. Undoubtedly they are 
influenced by some of the same factors as the 
smaller ASEAN states. But, as well as acquiring 
the modernised land forces, combat aircraft, 
warships and conventional submarines 
now entering the inventories of many other 
Asian states, they are building long-range 
strategic capabilities and nuclear warhead 
delivery platforms.
China and India are aspiring major 
powers, and their military acquisition 
programs reflect their ambitions.
They are also funding ambitious indigenous 
development programs—with varying 
degrees of success. For example, both 
countries have undertaken ambitious 
and expensive programs to design and 
build nuclear submarines to complement 
their conventional fleets, and both have 
encountered significant technical difficulties. 
The first generation of Chinese nuclear 
submarines are reportedly noisy and 
unreliable and patrols have been infrequent 
and confined to near waters.13 India’s 
protracted nuclear attack submarine program 
(the ‘Advanced Technology Vessel’) has been 
plagued by cost and schedule overruns.
There are many similarities in the approach 
of China and India to military developments, 
but there are also some differences that 
Strategic Insights 13
a greatly expanded Chinese submarine fleet 
are untrue—it is more accurately described 
as a modernisation, with 1960s and 1970s 
designs being phased out as modern designs 
enter service. Their capability will improve as 
experience is gained, and PLA(N) conventional 
submarines have already demonstrated a 
willingness to operate in the same water as 
the US fleet.
Chinese submarine capability will 
improve as experience is gained, and 
they have already demonstrated a 
willingness to operate in the same 
water as the US fleet.
The nuclear submarines will (eventually) 
provide a wide ranging patrol capability and 
will also form an important arm of China’s 
strategic nuclear capability. While the first 
generation nuclear boats were problematic, 
the second generation incorporate many 
of the lessons learned and are likely to 
be a significant step forward. The PLA(N) 
made, and there are no known indigenous 
development programs underway.14 However, 
informed observers have speculated that 
a Chinese carrier building program might 
commence in the next decade.15
The PLA(N) is also introducing a new class of 
Landing Platform Dock amphibious ships that 
will allow the deployment of a battalion group 
with associated vehicles, logistics support 
elements and helicopters. These ships will 
provide a significant capability lift over the 
more modest amphibious vessels currently 
in service. As well as providing a boost to 
any putative cross-Strait operation, this 
development is consistent with the general 
Chinese maritime goal of being able to project 
force out to the ‘first island chain’—essentially 
anywhere in the East or South China Seas.
In the field of submarines, China has a more 
active approach that neatly illustrates their 
dual ambitions of local strength in the short 
term (with emphasis on the Taiwan Strait) 
based on conventional submarines and a 
longer-term blue water capability based on 
nuclear submarines. Oft-repeated reports of 
The Russian-designed Sukhoi Flanker series of aircraft has been purchased by China (as shown here), India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. A very 
capable aircraft with long range and excellent aerodynamic performance, the relatively low price compared to Western aircraft makes the Flanker an 
attractive proposition. Photo: US Air Force
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As well as conducting its own R&D programs, 
China is conducting a range of espionage 
operations against Western governments and 
industry. In 1999, the Cox Report presented 
to the US Congress detailed a wide-ranging 
program of activities apparently designed to 
acquire state of the art Western technologies, 
allowing China to leap-frog design 
generations. The target of these efforts 
includes US nuclear weapon technologies 
and stealth design techniques for aircraft 
and missiles.17
For the first time in its history, 
India will have the wherewithal 
to play a major role beyond the 
confines of the subcontinent and will 
field an increasingly sophisticated 
arsenal of strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons.
India
Like China, India’s improved economic 
circumstances have allowed a substantial 
growth in defence spending over the past 
decade. Modernisation has been the order of 
the day, with many weapons systems now 
facing block redundancy. India will continue 
to build forces to meet pressing border and 
internal security requirements, but it now 
has the resources to also develop a force 
projection capability through enhanced 
maritime and air force capabilities. For the 
first time in its history, India will have the 
wherewithal to play a major role beyond the 
confines of the subcontinent. In addition, India 
will field an increasingly sophisticated arsenal 
of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.
India is now the largest importer of military 
hardware in the developing world.
is developing the SHANG-class nuclear 
attack submarine and the JIN-class nuclear 
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which will 
contribute to China’s nuclear strike capabilities 
as a back-up to road-mobile medium- and 
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.
In terms of conventional weapons, China is 
working to develop and deploy a range of 
precision-guided cruise missiles, including 
long-range anti-shipping and land strike cruise 
missiles. While Chinese long-range aircraft 
are of ageing design, the stand-off capability 
of cruise missiles provides them with a 
credible maritime and land strike capability. 
As well, China has been working on terminal 
guidance mechanisms for ballistic missiles to 
allow them to target ships on re-entry. This is 
consistent with the assessment in the latest 
iteration of the Pentagon’s annual review of 
Chinese military power that China is ‘seeking 
the capacity to hold surface ships at risk 
through a layered capability reaching out 
to the “second island chain” (i.e., the islands 
extending south and east from Japan, to and 
beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean)’.16
Closer to the mainland, many Chinese military 
developments over the last decade have 
had the net effect of making the Taiwan 
Strait more contestable or of blunting 
the strengths of US military power. The 
much-publicised anti-satellite missile test 
in 2006 was a ‘shot across the bows’ of US 
space-based command and control and 
intelligence-gathering systems. Similarly, 
China is known to be developing computer 
network operation capabilities. In a crisis, 
China could seek to disrupt US command and 
control and information systems to deny US 
forces access to critical real-time intelligence. 
Against the superiority of US conventional 
forces, these asymmetric tactics, combined 
with the low cost and wide availability of 
computing power, have the potential to give 
China an edge where conventional force 
development cannot.
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In recent years the Indian Air Force 
(IAF) strength has fallen from forty-five 
(authorised) to twenty-nine combat 
squadrons,18 but it is in the process of 
modernising its front-line combat aircraft. 
A competition between six manufacturers 
from the United States, Europe and Russia is 
underway to supply 126 multi-role combat 
aircraft, in addition to 180 Sukhoi Su-30MKI 
Flanker aircraft being acquired from Russia 
and by local production. Older aircraft in the 
Indian inventory will be upgraded and the 
IAF is developing the AEW&C and air-to-air 
refuelling capabilities required for modern 
air operations.
Similar modernisation programs are under 
way for land forces, where a large portion 
of the tank fleet requires replacement. An 
indigenous program has been protracted and 
has failed to meet the Army’s requirements, 
suffering from poor accuracy and frequent 
breakdowns. So India is again turning 
to foreign sources, and will purchase 
640 Russian-made T-90 advanced main battle 
tanks at a cost of US$2 billion while upgrading 
some older T-72 models.
Missile systems have been the lone 
success story of India’s R&D efforts. In 
April 2007, India successfully tested the 
nuclear-capable intermediate-range 
(< 3,500 km) two-stage Agni III after an earlier 
failure and is developing the longer-range 
Agni V (range > 5,000 km). Design work has 
commenced on an intercontinental ballistic 
missile with a range of up to 10,000km. India 
claims that it has demonstrated a nascent 
capacity to develop an anti-missile shield 
by intercepting ballistic missiles both in and 
outside the atmosphere during trials.19
Like China, India is introducing long-range 
cruise missiles with supersonic capabilities. 
The BrahMos missile, developed from 
a Russian design, has been in-service 
with the Indian Navy since 2006 and has 
The Soviet Union was India’s preferred 
supplier of military equipment during the 
Cold War. Although it still purchases 75% 
of its military hardware from Russia, it is 
increasingly looking to Western suppliers. 
Despite ongoing efforts to develop indigenous 
capabilities, the ability of India’s defence 
industry sector to meet its equipment 
requirements remains a distant prospect. 
With the notable exception of ballistic missile 
technology, the Indian Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO) has a poor 
record of delivering credible capabilities.
In keeping with its aim of becoming a 
dominant naval power in the region, the 
Indian Navy plans to enlarge and modernise 
its fleet from 140 to 180 warships by 2017 and 
has ambitions to incorporate modern aircraft 
carriers in the fleet. It currently operates a 
single obsolete aircraft carrier, the fifty year 
old INS Viraat (ex-Royal Navy HMS Hermes). 
Plans to replace the Viraat with a combination 
of ex-Russian and indigenously constructed 
hulls have run into difficulties. Negotiations 
with Russia on costs and schedule for 
refitting have on occasion been acrimonious, 
threatening to completely derail the project. 
And designing and building large and 
complex platforms such as aircraft carriers 
may be, at least for now, beyond the Indian 
shipbuilding industry.
Similarly, India’s nuclear submarine program 
has struggled for years, though it may deliver 
two vessels early next decade. Despite that, 
India is also leasing two Russian nuclear 
boats, and will build under licence French 
Scorpene conventional boats to revitalise 
its aging submarine fleet and arrest the 
decline in its submarine force levels. India 
has plans for amphibious force projection 
capabilities and has recently purchased a 
decommissioned US Navy landing platform 
dock as a first step in building a fleet of up to 
four amphibious ships.
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strongest—military power in the Western 
Pacific is the United States’.22
Its naval power allows the US to 
conduct operations against littoral or 
coastal targets anywhere in the world.
Needless to say, the incident created a 
strong impression in China and spurred 
the development and fielding of a range of 
asymmetric technologies, such as submarines 
and supersonic anti-ship missiles, which raises 
the stakes of such displays of US military 
power. As well, China now deploys around 
900 short-range ballistic missiles opposite 
Taiwan and is increasing that number by 
around 100 missiles per year, potentially 
allowing China to devastate Taiwanese 
response capabilities before the US could 
intervene decisively.
While the US probably still has the capability 
of operating in the waters around Taiwan 
with a high expectation of success, today 
it would do so at higher risk than in 1996. 
And the risk level will only increase with 
time, as Chinese capabilities improve in 
number and sophistication. At some stage, 
the risk to US forces should they intervene 
militarily on Taiwan’s behalf will become 
unacceptably high.
While the advantages of proximity and 
geography are with China in near waters, 
further afield the US will continue to be 
the dominant power, albeit with more 
competition. And the progress that China 
has made in that direction has unsettled 
some other players in the region. Australia’s 
2007 Defence Update identifies Chinese 
military power as having the potential to 
‘create misunderstandings and instability in 
the region’ while the 2007 Japanese Defence 
White Paper goes a step further and identifies 
Chinese military modernisation as a major 
also been adopted by the Indian Army. 
Air and submarine launch versions are in 
development, as is a hypersonic scram jet 
variant that has reportedly achieved speeds of 
5+ mach in laboratory testing.20
Major power interactions
There is little doubt that the United States will 
remain a major power in the Asian region for 
years to come. In terms of land forces, the US 
has maintained a significant presence in Japan 
since the end of WWII and in the Republic of 
Korea since the Korean War. While both of 
those deployments are being reduced in size, 
the US continues to invest heavily in its base 
on Guam, which will become an operating 
hub from which US forces can project force 
throughout the Pacific.
The US Air Force has global reach and the 
US Navy has an unmatched blue water 
power-projection capability, with multiple 
aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike group 
deployments in the region at any given 
time.21 Despite the interest being shown in 
aircraft carriers by China and India, it would 
be decades at a minimum before either could 
match US carrier capability in the open ocean.
Its naval power allows the US to conduct 
operations against littoral or coastal targets 
anywhere in the world. The presence of a 
carrier battle group can send a powerful 
signal in its own right. During the Taiwan 
Strait crisis of 1995–96, the US Navy was able 
to deploy carrier battle groups to the seas 
around Taiwan at short notice in response 
to provocative Chinese military exercises. 
As well, the USS Nimitz transited the Taiwan 
Strait, in what was widely interpreted as a 
show of US resolve in support of Taiwan. The 
message sent by the US was unambiguously 
reinforced when US Defense Secretary 
William Perry said that ‘Beijing should know, 
and this will remind them, that while they 
are a great military power, the premier—the 
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nuclear weapons tests. And the Russians will 
not give up their traditional markets in India 
without some serious marketing efforts that 
may include trade and other inducements. 
Most importantly, India will not simply 
become an extension of US power, and will 
have its own ideas on the future of Indian 
military power and alignment.
Cooperative activities
It is easy to slip into a discussion of military 
developments in Asia that is exclusively 
in terms of competition and friction. But 
that undersells the positive benefits that 
can accrue from a collective approach to 
regional security and the use of military 
power as a collective good. Exercises and 
the development of military to military 
relationships can build professionalism and 
reduce the possibility of misunderstandings 
and accidents. Cooperative approaches to 
policing and constabulary operations (such 
as anti-piracy or surveillance work) can make 
efficient use of shared resources.
The ASEAN states Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore have developed a joint 
approach to maritime security in 
Southeast Asia to contain the threat 
of piracy and terrorism in the region.
Asia is making some steps towards increased 
levels of cooperative defence activity. 
Formal military agreements sometimes fail 
to materialise from negotiations, as was 
demonstrated last year when Indonesia 
and Singapore ‘indefinitely postponed’ 
the ratification of a defence cooperation 
agreement.24 Nonetheless, there are some 
cooperative mechanisms being developed. 
The ASEAN states Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore have developed a joint approach 
to maritime security in Southeast Asia, 
security concern. The 2006 US Quadrennial 
Defence Review advocated cooperation with 
China that is balanced by prudent hedging 
against the possibility that cooperation 
might fail. One of the results of those lines 
of thought has been the development of a 
trilateral relationship between the United 
States, Japan and Australia. And that led 
to overtures to India to become part of a 
de facto alliance of democracies.
In contrast to its hedged strategy to China, 
the US has welcomed India onto the 
world stage and is actively courting Indian 
engagement, based on the judgement 
that a democratic power expanding its 
military does not present the same threat 
as an authoritarian one. In 2005, the Bush 
administration stated quite unequivocally 
that it is a goal of the United States to help 
India to become a major world power in 
the 21st century.23 Recently, the relationship 
between these two countries assumed an 
important strategic dimension, including 
offers of civilian nuclear assistance to India 
(still to be realised), increased participation in 
exercises and greater access to sophisticated 
US weapon systems. For example, the US 
manufacturers Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
will contest the Indian multi-role combat 
aircraft tender with, respectively, the F/A-18 
E/F Super Hornet and F-16 IN fighter aircraft.
India will not simply become an 
extension of US power, and will have 
its own ideas on the future of Indian 
military power and alignment.
Some sticking points remain in the developing 
relationship between the United States and 
India. For example, the nuclear cooperation 
program may founder on US requirements 
for restrictions on the production of fissile 
material for weapons and restraint from 
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In an excellent example of regional cooperation in the wake of the December 2004 Tsunami, the temporary control tower at Banda Aceh airport was 
given to Indonesia by the Singapore Military, while Royal Australian Air Force air traffic controllers and civilian Indonesian controllers worked side by side 
to oversee the movements of aircraft. Photo: Australian Department of Defence
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Implications for Australia
The regional environment that Australia will 
face in the future is much more complex than 
it has been in the recent past. Close to home 
we are faced with increasing numbers of 
sophisticated warships and combat aircraft. 
Further afield, middle powers are developing 
similar capabilities to our own, and are often 
fielding them in greater numbers. And the 
great power relationships of the region are 
shifting after fifty years of stability that suited 
us very well.
The great power relationships of the 
region are shifting after fifty years 
of stability that suited Australia 
very well.
But we should not lose perspective here. 
The increased stability and prosperity of our 
Southeast Asian neighbours that has allowed 
their military modernisation is very much 
a positive. Since World War II, the period of 
greatest strategic concern for Australia was 
during the Indonesian confrontation in the 
mid-1960s. The Menzies government made 
some far-reaching force structure decisions at 
that time, buying the Oberon class submarines 
as well as long range strike aircraft (although 
the F-111 was not delivered until the 1970s) 
and guided missile destroyers—capabilities 
now in the process of being replaced by their 
modern equivalents.
In the mid 1960s it was possible for Australia 
to buy hardware and capability that 
overmatched anything in the region. Our 
economic advantage meant that we could 
afford state of the art equipment that was 
beyond the reach of our neighbours. To an 
extent, that is still true today, but the gap 
has narrowed markedly and, if the current 
growth patterns continue, our advantage 
particularly in the Strait of Malacca, to 
contain the threat of piracy and terrorism 
in the region. The collective effort has 
involved coordinated patrols and the sharing 
of information between the participating 
countries. The benefit has been measurable, 
as there was a significant decrease in attacks 
in Southeast Asia in the first half of 2007.25
In North Asia, there are signs that some of 
the historical enmities are being overcome. 
South Korea and Japan are developing an 
agreement of defence cooperation that would 
have seemed highly improbable a decade ago. 
The two countries have agreed to exchange 
military personnel and to cooperate on search 
and rescue and humanitarian operations. 
For the latter, both countries will have large 
amphibious ships that will be able to deliver 
assistance and large quantities of food and 
medical supplies. Australia’s amphibious ships 
will be able to play a similar role, and the total 
capability of the region to provide assistance 
in the case of a widespread natural disaster 
will be impressive.
But there is also a need to ensure that 
the operation of new military capabilities 
by inexperienced states does not lead 
to misunderstandings or accidents. For 
example, we noted earlier that conventional 
submarines are being acquired for the first 
time by countries around the region. By 
their very nature, submarine operations are 
sensitive and have the potential to be quite 
provocative, especially when employed in 
clandestine intelligence gathering operations. 
Submarines must practice ‘shadowing’ 
surface vessels, which by definition places 
them in the same area as other vessels 
where they can be involved in collisions 
or near misses with shipping. Some of the 
narrow waters of the region are shallow 
(which causes submarines to operate near 
the surface) and also very heavily used by 
commercial shipping, raising the possibility of 
an accident.
20 Asian military trends and their implications for Australia
• the ability to conduct stabilisation 
operations in nearby countries
• other non-combat operations, including 
humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief operations.
Broadly speaking, we want to be able to 
defeat attacks on our national interests 
where our resources allow and to help achieve 
strategic outcomes that are consonant 
with our interests. Some times that can be 
achieved by fielding sufficient forces to deter 
potential adversaries and dissuade them from 
the early use of force in times of tension. As 
well, possessing credible defence capabilities 
can reassure friends and allies and strengthen 
their resolve. But sometimes we may be 
called upon to fight—which is when having 
the right force structure matters most. So 
it is worth understanding how changing 
circumstances might impact on the ability of 
the ADF to fight and win.
For the time being, the biggest impact on the 
ADF’s warfighting ability will be felt in our 
ability to make a meaningful contribution to 
coalition operations far from Australia. In air 
and maritime operations, the ADF is much 
better equipped to deal with likely scenarios 
close to home. Australia cannot be directly 
threatened, in the conventional military 
sense, by any Southeast Asian state. Our air 
and maritime capabilities would ensure that 
any threat would be dealt with in our air-sea 
approaches. While our near neighbours are 
acquiring newer and more sophisticated 
capabilities, the ability to project power across 
the air-sea gap to the north of Australia and 
defeat the ADF (which would be operating 
with all of the advantages of a defensive 
posture and proximity to bases) will remain 
well beyond them for decades at least.
Ironically, the most contentious of 
capabilities—the Royal Australian Air Force’s 
(RAAF) air combat force—is actually very well 
will be further eroded. Access to advanced US 
technologies may keep us ahead of European 
and Russian sourced equipment, but the 
capability differential will narrow.
ADF Capability
The Defence White Paper currently in 
development will need to factor our 
narrowing capability advantage into its 
calculus. The force structure we aim for 
should be dictated by what we want the 
ADF to be able to do, and the environment 
it will have to operate in. The trends in Asia 
discussed in this paper are in the process of 
making the likely operating environment 
considerably more challenging. That will have 
implications for the force structure of the ADF 
that are worth understanding. Rather than 
simply perpetuating a force structure that has 
served us well for the last four decades, it may 
be time to think hard about change.
Rather than simply perpetuating a 
force structure that has served us well 
for the last four decades, it may be 
time to think hard about change.
The Defence White Paper is about matching 
resources to strategy. And that strategy is 
likely to contain requirements for the ADF that 
follow from some enduring considerations:
• the ability to defend Australia from direct 
attack, with particular emphasis on our air 
and sea approaches
• the ability to conduct combat operations 
in Southeast Asia, either alone or in 
coalition with other countries
• the ability to contribute meaningfully 
to coalition combat operations in more 
distant theatres
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units over the horizon.26 But Australia has an 
Achilles heel below the water. As ASPI has 
reported before, the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) capability of the ADF is currently in 
poor shape, meaning that the proliferation 
of capable submarines in the region has the 
potential to seriously affect the freedom of 
action of the RAN’s surface fleet.27
Even still, the ADF is well-placed to defend 
the continent against any regional power. 
However, we should not have any expectation 
of being able to unilaterally defend Australia 
against a major power. In 1942, Australia 
could not have successfully opposed a major 
Japanese operation directed towards Australia 
without the assistance of the United States. 
A similar conclusion holds today—if a major 
power could stage through the archipelago 
and capture or develop the bases and supply 
mechanisms required to support major 
operations, the ADF would not have the 
capacity to resist indefinitely. Our alliance 
with the United States will continue to be 
necessary if we are to contemplate defeating 
a threat from a major power. Of course, much 
would have to happen before that particular 
scenario came to pass. The chances are high 
that Australian forces would be committed 
to action in a theatre further away before 
the defence of the mainland became a 
major concern.
Any such commitment would most likely 
be as part of a coalition with the United 
States and/or other Asian countries. And 
that is just as well—Australia’s ability to 
take a fight to a major power unilaterally 
is limited. The lack of fixed wing naval air 
power means that Australian aircraft would 
have to rely on forward basing and therefore 
almost automatically be involved in coalition 
operations. The size of the Army and the 
ADF’s relatively small amphibious capability 
limits the ADF’s ability to conduct operations 
away from Australia in any opposed 
scenario. (Even with the two new ships next 
placed to meet any regional challenge. The air 
forces of Southeast Asia are likely to remain 
modest in size and will not have the full suite 
of support capabilities in the form of air-to-air 
refuelling, electronic warfare self-protection 
and attack systems and airborne early 
warning aircraft that the RAAF will have. 
(The exception is the Republic of Singapore 
Air Force, which will be very capable, but is 
not a likely adversary for Australia.) The Super 
Hornet will provide a substantial capability 
jump over the current Hornet and (except 
for range) F-111. While developments in the 
systems and weapons fitted to regional 
aircraft such as the Sukhoi Flanker family 
have the potential to erode the Super Hornet’s 
advantage over time, Australia will have 
breathing space for the later acquisition of 
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). If the ‘worst case’ 
scenarios of Flanker developments actually 
come to pass, the fifth generation capabilities 
of the JSF would maintain Australia’s 
capability edge against those fourth 
generation aircraft. The Super Hornet and the 
JSF would provide a valuable contribution to 
coalition operations further from home and 
would plug seamlessly into US command and 
control systems.
… we should not have any expectation 
of being able to unilaterally defend 
Australia against a major power.
Our naval forces do not have such a clear-cut 
advantage against the navies of Southeast 
Asia. With the air defence upgrades to the 
ANZAC frigates and FFGs and, in the future, 
Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs), Australian 
surface fleets should be able to operate 
against regional air threats with reasonable 
expectations of survivability. With an 
embarked helicopter, Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN) surface combatants currently have the 
capability to target and strike other surface 
22 Asian military trends and their implications for Australia
heavy reliance on networked capabilities. 
While networking can be a force multiplier 
in the right circumstances, it can also be a 
vulnerability—forces need to be able to act 
independently if their supporting networks 
are significantly disrupted.
There are good reasons to have the ability 
to strike targets at long range from home. 
It can have a deterrent effect during periods 
of tension and can tie up disproportionate 
adversary resources during times of conflict. 
That is true whether operating alone or in 
coalition, so strike capabilities should not 
be limited to the near neighbourhood of 
Southeast Asia, but should be able to operate 
in distant theatres as well. Currently, the one 
mechanism by which Australia can strike 
at a distant adversary with a good degree 
of survivability is through our submarines, 
although the size of the fleet and current lack 
of land strike capability are limiting factors in 
terms of impact. The difficulty of dealing with 
submarines is a double edged sword. ASW is 
as difficult for possible adversaries as it is for 
the ADF and its allies.
To be more effective in combat operations in 
the future, Australia’s force structure should 
shift in the following directions:
• away from major surface vessels as the 
major naval capability and towards a 
larger fleet of submarines that have 
anti-shipping and land strike capabilities
• surface vessels should have much better 
capability in the anti-submarine warfare 
role and an improved over-the horizon 
anti-shipping capability via their embarked 
helicopters.
There is no reference to land operations in 
the above discussion. That is because Army 
has little role in the defence of Australia, at 
least as far as defeating an adversary in the 
air and maritime approaches is concerned. 
It does however have a significant role to 
play in combat operations elsewhere, as has 
decade, the ADF will be able to deploy only 
1,500 troops—about two thirds of a ‘hardened 
and networked’ Army battle group.)
The ability to contribute meaningfully to 
coalition operations is important. It sends 
a message to allies that we are prepared 
to shoulder part of the collective burden 
and, though it has not been an issue in 
recent conflicts, it is possible that a solid 
ADF contribution could make a difference 
in a finely-balanced conflict between larger 
powers. Some of the technologies being 
developed for area denial and for asymmetric 
attack by the rising powers of Asia should give 
us pause for thought about the capabilities 
we could bring to the fight.
It is possible that a solid ADF 
contribution could make a difference 
in a finely-balanced conflict between 
larger powers.
Two related developments that the ADF is 
not currently well-equipped to deal with are 
the proliferation of submarines throughout 
the region and the deployment of supersonic 
sea-skimming missiles by Russia, China 
and India. Both bring into question the 
survivability of surface vessels, especially 
when operating in small task groups. And 
while the Air Warfare Destroyers about to 
begin construction will provide a measure 
of protection against even the most 
sophisticated missiles, a simultaneous attack 
with multiple missiles (admittedly not easy to 
coordinate) has the potential to overwhelm 
the defences. Possible future deployments 
of terminally-guided ballistic missiles would 
only make the challenge of protecting surface 
fleets more difficult.
The ability of China in particular to conduct 
cyber attack and to target space-based 
capabilities also calls into question any 
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operations in which the embarked forces 
could be decisive. That limited capability 
comes at a significant opportunity cost in 
the Defence Capability Plan and has the 
potential to further erode the funds available 
for other projects if costs increase over 
the lifetime of the project. Given the less 
demanding requirements of likely regional 
deployments, much cheaper ships based on 
civilian designs might have offered a more 
cost-effective solution.
Major power engagement
Emerging shifts in great power relations will 
pose challenges for Australia. The end state 
of World War II in the Asia–Pacific area, with 
a culturally similar Western nation in the 
ascendancy, was very much to Australia’s 
advantage. Today we are firmly allied with the 
United States, but also have strong economic 
relationships with established and rising 
powers. China and India will have a much 
greater role to play in the coming decades, 
and Australia has to find a path through the 
jostling for position that is likely to occur.
Were great power relations in the 
Asia Pacific to deteriorate, there is the 
potential for our alliance with the 
United States to embroil us in periods 
of tension or even conflict.
Our alliance with the United States has been 
a cornerstone of defence policy for decades. 
That position is likely to continue, but it 
carries some risks as well as benefits. Were 
great power relations in the Asia Pacific to 
deteriorate, there is the potential for our 
alliance with the United States to embroil 
us in periods of tension or even conflict. Of 
course, Australia has a clear interest in the 
balance of power in Asia, and we may well 
find our interests strongly aligned with those 
been demonstrated numerous times in the 
past. Today the most valuable contribution 
we make to coalition operations in many 
circumstances is through the deployment 
of Special Forces and other high-demand 
units (such as combat engineers). Australian 
land forces are also often called upon for 
stabilisation and service-assisted evacuation 
operations and for disaster relief and 
humanitarian operations.
However, Army is not currently structured 
around this two-tiered set of requirements. 
The traditional combined arms approach of 
infantry, armour and artillery is less relevant 
for near-region stabilisation and assistance 
missions and has not proven to be required 
in recent coalition operations. A restructure 
of Army that focused on developing more 
Special Forces for deployment to war zones in 
coalition activities and other units for regional 
missions with less potential for combat would 
seem better suited to the likely missions 
to be faced in the future. Such a structure 
would mean that Australian land forces 
would be less able to make conventional 
contributions to a general land war, such 
as might be envisaged on the Korean 
Peninsular. And Australia’s ability to conduct 
land operations in the near region—such as 
operations to deny the use of forward bases 
to a would-be adversary or against border 
incursions—would also be circumscribed. 
However, such operations could only be 
safely conducted with air cover, which could 
arguably counter the development of adverse 
events that might demand a land-based 
capability anyway.
Applying similar reasoning to the means by 
which deployments are made brings into 
question the value of investing several billion 
dollars in two large amphibious ships. While 
they offer a substantial capability to conduct 
stabilisation and humanitarian operations 
and could prove valuable in service-protected 
evacuations, it is hard to envisage opposed 
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Minor power engagement
Although our views and actions will matter, 
Australia will not have a central role in the 
development of major power relationships in 
Asia. But we can play a more important role 
in assisting the smaller regional powers to 
become part of a shared security architecture. 
In particular, encouraging the development 
of professionalism in ASEAN countries is 
in our interest. And, as the example of the 
cooperative approach between Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore on surveillance and 
counter-piracy shows, the pooled resources of 
several countries can be effective in dealing 
with shared security problems.
The growing resources of ASEAN nations is 
not simply going towards major equipment 
purchases, but also towards re-focusing 
military training and postures away from 
internal security operations and towards 
external defence of sovereignty. This 
is occurring in a period of low levels of 
inter-state tensions and rivalry, which 
provides a window of opportunity for 
encouraging collective behaviour and for 
setting up mechanisms by which future 
tensions can be managed.
There is scope for Australia to help 
develop protocols and agreements to 
minimise the possibility of accidents 
and misunderstandings which could 
cause friction.
Regional countries have seen some of the 
benefits that can accrue from cooperative 
approaches. Australia has also provided 
mentoring for regional militaries on the 
appropriate division of responsibility between 
military and constabulary forces. And the 
military capabilities of region have provided 
valuable assistance in humanitarian crises. 
As regional militaries increase their capability 
of the United States. But we might sometimes 
reach different judgements on the best 
way to engage rising powers and shape our 
policies accordingly.
For example, Australia maintained a firmly 
cooperative approach to China for many 
years, while the United States has leaned 
more towards strategies developed to hedge 
against growing Chinese military power. In 
the last few years of the Howard government, 
the balance of Australia’s approach shifted 
noticeably towards the hedging end of the 
spectrum, embracing rhetoric couched 
in terms of an ‘alliance of democracies’, 
participating in missile defence developments 
and formalising security arrangements that 
could be interpreted as an attempt to isolate 
non-democratic China.
A strategy of containment of China will 
become increasingly difficult to sustain as 
Chinese power continues to grow and there 
are indications that the Rudd government 
will take a different tack to its predecessor. 
We should capitalise on China’s need for 
the region to remain stable for the sake 
of its own economic development to 
involve it in developing regional security 
mechanisms. While it is natural to begin with 
second-order issues such as anti-piracy and 
constabulary operations, in time we may 
aim for a cooperative approach to first-order 
security issues.
As a robust democracy, India is relatively 
transparent about its intentions. A response 
to the rise of India will, in many ways, be 
easier to coordinate with allies. While there 
will still be issues on which we will differ, 
such as the export of nuclear material 
and technology, the approach of Western 
countries to India will be generally welcoming 
and cooperative, with little by way of hedging. 
In fact, the most likely source of friction will 
be Indian aloofness and reluctance to align 
itself to the degree that the United States 
would like.
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